Wyre Forest Gamers

The British & Canadian Infantry in Normandy 1944

Patrols

The bibliography for this series of articles is available here

Patrolling a wood on exercise in the UK, ©IWM H9990

Patrolling - Theory

British and Canadian army doctrine accorded a high level of importance to patrolling. All the infantry training manuals from 1937 to 1944 contained extensive sections on the organisation and conduct of patrols and the instructions contained therein remained remarkably consistent throughout the period. Three types of patrol were described in the training material: -

Reconnoitering Patrols - the purposes of this method of patrolling were to provide protection and security, to maintain contact with the enemy or to obtain information. The manuals recommended that such patrols should be small, lightly equipped, thoroughly briefed and well led. The actual conduct of the patrol would be determined by its objective, the terrain that would be encountered and whether the action was taking place during the day or at night. The officer sending out the patrol would usually determine the route and the approach to the enemy position would be executed in a series of bounds, flanking it if possible. If the patrol were taking place in the dark movement should not be by bounds but at a steady pace with frequent short stops.

Fighting Patrols - were aimed at harassing the enemy by countering his own patrolling activities, capturing prisoners and bringing back wounded comrades. It was expected that they would be commanded by an officer or senior NCO and would usually consist of at least two sections. Preliminary study of the ground to be covered was considered essential and careful planning was required to achieve success. Once the patrol was underway the manuals suggested that the commander should be in the best position to direct his men, the front and flanks should be protected and a more open formation should be adopted when the patrol was in close contact with the enemy. At night, a much closer formation was preferable and silent movement at a steady pace was vital.

Sherwood Foresters patrolling on exercise 1941, ©IWM H 12482

Standing Patrols - were normally sent out to watch an approach by which an enemy move was anticipated. The strength of the patrol would depend on how long it was expected to be in position and the level of expected interference from the enemy. The patrol commander had to know in advance what do do if the enemy should appear, how much resistance he was expected to offer if attacked, which points to hold, how often to report back and the intended escape route. The patrol should also be situated in a position which provided good all-round protection.

The training manuals emphasised the need for careful preparation and practice for all patrolling activities. The Infantry Training Manual Part VIII – Fieldcraft, Battle Drill, Section and Platoon Tactics (March 1944) set out a number of tasks to perform before a patrol could commence. These included studying the ground and making a plan in advance, ensuring, if possible, that all members of a patrol were involved in preliminary reconnaissance and that a daylight rehearsal should take place so the men would be aware of which formation to adopt, what action to take on encountering the enemy, what signals to use and who would be responsible for watching flanks and rear.

The insistence on patrolling was not purely motivated by the requirements to obtain information, harass the enemy or provide security and protection. Psychological considerations were almost as important as material factors. Keeping men 'up to the mark', preventing a stagnation mentality (particularly when the front was static for long periods), and giving the enemy no rest were rationale enough for most officers in justifying regular patrols.

The syllabus taught in the UK Battle Schools included training for patrolling at night. This consisted of a series of lectures in the classroom and then practice in the field.

Infantry patrol in Caen July, ©IWM B 6919

Patrolling - Practice

It is clear that patrolling was a common feature of military life for infantrymen of the British and Canadian armies in Normandy. In memoirs and personal recollections there are many accounts of participation in these expeditions and they attest to their nerve-wracking and stressful nature. Patrols placed a great deal of initiative and responsibility in the hands of junior officers and NCOs and while some relished the prospect, others found the burden imposed heavy and onerous. Indeed, a significant number of soldiers thought patrols were a 'necessary evil'. Although most infantrymen would participate willingly in patrolling, officers had to provide convincing reasons to explain the activity and justify its necessity by giving clear objectives. Men were usually in considerable danger when setting out on patrol given the prevalence of mines, booby-traps and the close proximity of the enemy, so it was understandable that they should believe what they were doing was essential. However, if no good reason were given for patrolling this wore on men's nerves and caused problems with morale. Lieutenant Sydney Jary recalled in his memoirs: -

"I now think that if battalion and brigade commanders had asked themselves whether there was any really good purpose being served by ordering this patrol or that patrol, this activity from defensive positions would have been greatly reduced. I used to wonder if many patrols were ordered because somebody at Brigade or Division thought it was time we did one and then invented an excuse, rather than a reason for doing so". (Jary p72)

Jary considered the thinking behind this policy 'superficial' and probably left over from the First World War when the 'need to dominate No-Man's Land' was often the reason given for mounting patrols, trench-raiding parties and the like. Many men harboured the suspicion that some CO's ordered patrols just to demonstrate to their superiors that they were 'on the ball'. Canadian officers who responded to post-war battle questionnaires also thought that patrols that had been mandated at brigade level were 'too cut and dried' and did not allow patrol leaders to use their own initiative. A further complaint was that the intelligence received from higher headquarters could be very inaccurate and far removed from actual operations. There was a general consensus that further and continuous training should be provided, especially for night patrols. (Engen p115)

Infantry patrol in orchard near Vire August, ©IWM B 8510

The actual composition of patrols was another area where practice differed widely from the advice contained in the training manuals, particularly with regard to fighting patrols. Some officers preferred to set out in strength (at least a full platoon) and sometimes with supporting fire from mortars and field artillery. One Canadian officer wrote that fighting patrols were never large enough to take on even small German defensive positions and that far too much stress was placed on keeping men in the main position at all times.

However, other officers favoured minimal numbers in fighting patrols. They were sure that good camouflage, stealth and guile would be more effective than numbers in achieving the objective. Lieutenant Jary was an advocate of this approach; he considered that the twelve to twenty strong fighting patrol advocated by the Battle Schools would be too big and unwieldy to control in a skirmish, particularly at night, and so he usually cut the number down to single figures. To be fair to the training material, it was made clear that there was no hard and fast rule about the composition of such patrols and flexibility, as always, was tolerated and even encouraged.

Despite the instructions in the training manuals that patrols should be well planned and prepared there is plenty of evidence that a significant number were hastily contrived operations. Many officers were unhappy that they were not given enough time to plan their patrol routes. Insufficient preparation greatly increased the chances that the patrol would suffer casualties or fail in its objective. Nevertheless, a large number of patrols were sent out whether they were fully prepared or not. Lieutenant Robert Woollcombe, a platoon commander in the King's Own Scottish Borderers, recalled in his memoirs that after his platoon had reached its objective on the first day of Operation EPSOM, 26th June, he was approached by his company commander and given the following order: -

"'I want you to take out eight men with a Bren and patrol the Company front for snipers'. He indicated the area to be covered. 'Report when you're back'".

Woollcombe rapidly selected a section and set off through the cornfields in an arrowhead formation, conscious that at any moment "...a good burst from a spandau would have finished the lot of us". No sniper positions were located but, on the way back, the patrol wounded and captured an SS man. "We carried him into the Company positions, the centre of all eyes, and set him down like a trophy at Company Headquarters". The incredulous look on the company commander's face showed how little he had expected from this impromptu expedition. (Woollcombe pp60-62)

The Effectiveness of Patrols

Patrolling was an unpopular form of warfare. It was risky and dangerous to those taking part, it added greatly to the levels of stress and exhaustion experienced by the fighting soldier and, as we have seen, many officers and men considered the activity to be badly organised, unproductive and often without justification. Some Canadian officers claimed that too much patrolling drove the Germans to 'hole up' in their defensive positions and so reduced the chances of taking prisoners who could then be interrogated. Patrols often failed, particularly when conducted by inexperienced troops (as the vast majority of infantrymen in Normandy were, at least initially) and casualties could be heavy. No wonder then that an officer of the Black Watch remarked "...the very word 'patrol' could send shivers down people's backs".

However, patrolling could produce positive results. Sydney Jary considered that standing and reconnaissance patrols were "...invariably useful because they provided information, if only negative". Although he was highly critical of some aspects of fighting patrols, even he had to concede that they did make the opposition 'jumpy' and caused the Germans many sleepless nights.

Evidence from the battle questionnaires completed by Canadian officers after the war indicates that many of them took great pride in their patrolling work. The impression given by their comments is that patrolling was persistent and aggressive and it led to the domination of the ground in front of the Canadian company lines. There is no mention of German patrol activity being particularly effective. This view is supported by the comments of Lieutenant Jary: -

"Where we patrolled extensively, they avoided it. I can remember only one successful German patrol and not one successful night action". (Jary p17)

Information gathered from patrols was important in understanding enemy dispositions and even more comprehensive information could be obtained if a prisoner were brought back as well. Battalion Intelligence Officers relied on such results to help produce the reports that gave the British and Canadian armies a distinct advantage over their adversaries in the field of intelligence gathering. Patrolling did produce important results although the cost was often high.

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