“I saw very few live Germans face to face. Now and again in an observation post I would glimpse one or two. Similarly when advancing at the head of a rifle platoon…Nearly all fighting takes place between hidden enemies, everybody being under the best cover they could find”. (Picot p.299)

Even when combat was at its most intense, observation of opponents was fleeting. The author of the War Diary of ‘H’ Company, 8th Rifle Brigade, involved in ferocious fighting on Hill 112 at the end of June, stated that it was remarkable, given the heavy casualties suffered, how very few enemy troops were actually seen by the Company during this period.

Observation training was covered, to some extent, in the training manuals and the Battle School courses. Instructions on observation were included in both the Instructor’s Handbook and Infantry Training. Drills, involving the firing of live rounds, were given to teach men the difference between the ‘crack’ heard as the bullet passed by and the later ‘thump’ as it left the gun barrel, thus giving an opportunity to estimate the direction and distance of the firer. The Instructor’s Handbook also included a section on advanced observation training involving the use of field glasses, observation by the section as a team and locating the enemy when observation alone failed. Both official publications stressed that to be successful in observation techniques a high degree of skill was necessary and constant practice essential.

“Our troops must know whether small arms fire is close to them or not, that is, they must know their crack and thump so that they can tell whether the fire is falling 50 yards or 5ft away from their heads. They now come into battle assuming that every round they hear passes just above the napes of their necks. They believe their enemies are crack shots who will bring them certain death. Hence they are paralysed and go to ground”.

Because Battle Inoculation training failed to replicate the actual experience of contact with the Germans, infantrymen in France found themselves in the difficult position of trying to identify enemy positions without knowing if fire was friendly or hostile or directed against them or not.

It was recognised before the invasion that the measures in place to locate the enemy in battle were far from satisfactory. In January 1944, the AORG were asked to find methods that would yield an immediate improvement in the visual spotting of enemy targets. The short term recommendations arrived at were, firstly, that there should be more rigorous selection of men with superior visual acuity to train as spotters and secondly, that increased attention should be given to their training. A number of long-term suggestions were also made but none of these proposals had been put in place by the summer. At the time 21st Army Group landed in France standard practice in the infantry section was that all its members were on the lookout constantly for enemy fire and that, once spotted, the information was to be passed on verbally to the Section Commander who would then issue orders. In the heat and noise of battle the opportunities for misunderstanding and delay were all too prevalent and by the time a response had been decided on and orders issued, the target would have often inflicted casualties or moved to another position.

At unit level, some commanders began to realise that new tactical approaches were necessary when the whereabouts of the enemy were imperfectly known. Lieutenant-Colonel George Taylor, taking command of 5th Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry after its mauling at Hill 112 in mid July, introduced a number of tactical innovations to deal with the issue of enemy concealment. Likening the essence of infantry tactics to “…a policeman tackling a desperate man in a dark room – one had to find him first with one hand before hitting him with a baton”, Taylor first of all created a scout platoon for reconnaissance. Secondly, he decided that unless the location of the enemy was known with a good degree of accuracy, doctrine should be based on the principle of the minimum number of troops leading an attack and the maximum held in reserve for manoeuvre. Generally, in a platoon assault there would be only one section up instead of the usual two, with the remainder moving in depth over 300 yards behind (they would be closer together in wooded terrain). In a company attack there would be one platoon up and two back and the ‘opening bid’ in a battalion attack would be one company forward, one in immediate support and two held in reserve for manoeuvre. 

Great depth and the maximum volume of firepower were emphasised for all types of attack. These tactical changes soon reaped dividends. The attack by the battalion on le Plessis-Grimault in early August, supported by a squadron of tanks from 4/7th Dragoon Guards and an artillery barrage, incorporated a spearhead company, one in support and two in reserve. A silent night attack down the slope of Mont Pinçon and into the village achieved complete tactical surprise. In the next attack, ‘D’ Company, reinforced by one platoon from ‘C’ Company, advanced in a wide outflanking movement, avoiding detection from the enemy occupying the high ground north of the village of Culey-le-Patry and seized their objective. With justifiable pride, Taylor stated that the attack “…had been carried through like a demonstration at the School of Infantry”. This action showed that a flexible attitude to doctrine and an imaginative use of fire and movement techniques could compensate for the inability of infantry units to locate enemy positions with accuracy.

Early in the campaign, some observers were frustrated and annoyed that officers were making themselves easy targets for snipers by, for example, carrying map boards which glinted in the sun. However, by the time the Operational Research report was written, most infantry officers and NCOs of 21st Army Group had actively embraced all of the actions proposed within. R.M. Wingfield recounts a conversation with an experienced Corporal that took place in September 1944. It gives a fascinating insight into the responsiveness and adaptability of infantrymen in the Normandy campaign: -

“[The] business of calling officers and NCOs by their [first] names. Know why? It’s a slow process but it’s logical. A sniper is trained to pick worthwhile targets. The worthwhile targets are officers and NCOs because they make all the decisions and give the orders. So, all the badges of rank disappear. Now the sniper is told to watch for the man with the revolver. So, after some casualties, the revolver is replaced by a rifle…Anything else a sniper could look for? The collar and tie. That’s fixed. The boots, brown instead of black? That’s fixed also. A sniper can soon learn to understand the English phrases ‘Yes Sir! Sergeant! Or Corporal!’ That accounts for the Christian names lark.” (Wingfield p.31)

Examination of the issues of enemy location, battle inoculation and exposure to risk that were faced by the infantry of 21st Army Group reveals a familiar picture of weak doctrine and deficiencies in training, mitigated by adaptability and initiative in the field. Some of the problems had been recognised before the invasion, and recommendations made, but little had been done in practice by the time the campaign commenced. However, some unit and sub-unit commanders responded to the challenges and were responsible for the introduction of important tactical changes. These had the effect of not only reducing losses, but also of increasing manoeuvrability and flexibility in attack.