The British & Canadian Infantry in Normandy 1944
Infantry in the Defence - Bite and Hold
The bibliography for this series of articles is available here
'Platoon in the Attack - Flanking Movement' diagram from Infantry Training showing section positions for consolidation
The Doctrine of 'Bite and Hold'
We saw in the previous article that the optimal use of available firepower (both small arms and support weapons) improved the chances of success in attack. It also conferred a significant advantage in defence. This was crucial, as a fundamental assumption of operational technique, as understood by senior commanders in 21st Army Group, was that once the infantry had taken an objective they would be able to consolidate the position and defend it effectively – a doctrine known as ‘bite and hold’. In this article I will examine how well this tactical approach was reflected in the training and equipment of the rifle companies, and how successfully it was implemented in practice.
Lieutenant General Simonds' directive on Operational Policy, issued on 17 February 1944, with which Lieutenant-General Dempsey (commanding officer of 2nd British Army) and Montgomery were in complete accord, set out the ‘bite and hold’ doctrine which was to dictate the approach that 21st Army Group would employ in Normandy. After noting that German forward defensive positions were usually lightly held but with substantial numbers of mortars three or four thousand yards to the rear, Simonds expressed confidence that a well planned infantry attack with ample fire support would be able to penetrate a such a position with “comparative ease”. However, as long as the enemy possessed the means, heavy and continuous counter-attacks could be expected, supported by self-propelled guns and mortars. It was, therefore, vital that support in the form of tanks, anti-tank guns or medium artillery (controlled by a forward observation officer) was immediately available to the infantry once the objective had been reached. Experience of the early fighting in Normandy did not lead Simonds to alter his views significantly. In his Tactical Notes, issued on 1st July, he listed three crucial tasks which infantry needed to perform once an objective had been seized: the position had to be ‘mopped up’ (that is, the defenders had to be killed or captured before they could recover), troops had to be dispersed on captured ground, and immediate reconnaissance performed to see if rapid exploitation were possible. He also reiterated that tanks or anti-tank guns should be brought forward quickly to secure the gains.
Despite Simonds' injunction to execute speedy reconnaissance, British and Canadian Army doctrine had long recognised (based on the experience of the First World War) that the heavy physical and mental exhaustion suffered by infantry in the successful assault of an enemy position meant that rapid exploitation of the situation would not, in most cases, be feasible and that consolidation of the position should be the first priority. This was set out clearly in the Infantry Section Leading pamphlet of 1938: -
"The period following the capture of an objective is one of slight disorganisation when a reaction after effort is likely to set in; during this period troops are very vulnerable to a counter-attack. For this reason immediate steps to consolidate the ground won is essential".
This chimed perfectly with Montgomery's very cautious approach to offensive action and his preoccupation about nursing the brittle morale of his soldiers. However, the instructions delivered at the School of Infantry and the advice given by the training material placed much more emphasis on teaching the attacking techniques needed to seize an objective, rather than the skills required to hold it. The Instructor's Handbook contained 75 pages of instruction on section and platoon attacks; only 26 were devoted to defence. The manual did contain a number of drills for defensive action but there were no specific recommendations on how to consolidate a captured objective. The mindset of the authors of the Instructor's Handbook is, perhaps, best illustrated by the chapter title they chose to cover this aspect of tactical training - 'Platoon Battle Drills for Offensive Defence'. In the Infantry Training manual, published eighteen months after the Instructor's Handbook, the amount of space devoted to defensive training was reduced still further as all the drills described in the previous publication were omitted. However, the later pamphlet did contain a section on consolidation. In this, Infantry Training acknowledged that the consolidation of an objective was difficult but it was the duty of the attacking troops to ensure that it was held against counter-attacks. The manual placed emphasis on the importance of rapid preparation of the position, the requirement to dig-in, the provision of all-round defensive fire and the need to establish communications with other platoons and the Company Headquarters. It also laid out the positions beyond the objective that sections should occupy once the objective had been secured (see the diagram above). However, the section on ‘Consolidation’ only consisted of four short paragraphs and did not describe any drills to aid training.
Infantry using a sighting device, 28 June ©IWM B 6139
Concerns about Failings in Defensive Tactics
The emphasis on offensive action in the training material and the teaching of the Battle Schools was only to be expected. The British and Canadian forces raised in the years following Dunkirk were going to have to return to the continent at some point and defeat the Axis powers in battle, so the bias toward offensive tactics was natural. However, some instructors and attendees at the School of Infantry did raise concerns that a doctrinal over-concentration on attack was neglecting the art of defence. The notes for a lecture entitled “The Firm Base”, dated January 1944, began with the words “Since Oct. 42 we have been advancing. [This] leads to popular misconception that we need not study defence”. It went on to say:-
“There is no better way of Killing Bosche (sic) if you can make him attack you when and where you want. But he must dance to your tune. The most costly operation of war is the attack that fails”.
There were also worries that some of the principles of the ‘bite and hold’ approach as set out by Simonds and others were in conflict with instructions given in training. A delegate at the Infantry School Conference in April 1944 commented that current doctrine taught that attacking units should not pause on the objective but reorganise beyond it. “As a result, there is a tendency for the objective not to be ‘mopped-up’”. The recommendation not to consolidate on captured ground made perfect sense as the location would have been well known to enemy mortars and artillery. However, in the eagerness to establish a new defensive line, pockets of resistance were easily missed.
Infantry training was also deficient in that it did not pay adequate attention to the nature of the German defences that 21st Army Group troops could expect to encounter in Normandy. Although senior commanders such as Simonds had a very clear idea of what the defensive attitude of the enemy would be, this information was not consistently passed on to the junior commanders and NCOs who attended the Battle Schools. They were not made aware of typical features of German technique such as the lightly held forward line, the use of reverse slopes and the depth of defences. The reverse slope defence in particular still had the ability to surprise British and Canadian infantry in Normandy, even though it had been used extensively in North Africa. The usual German practice was for defenders to lightly occupy the crest of a hill with the main force held much lower down the reverse slope. This tactic was ignored in many exercises held in England, however, as hill crests were usually set as the objectives for attacking forces (based on the principle that it was always advantageous to hold the high ground). During Operation EPSOM the Royal Scots Fusiliers reached the crest of a hill and were shocked to find enemy troops dug in on the reverse slope, something, a survivor claimed "...we had never envisaged". (Hastings p.141). It is little wonder that Sydney Jary ruefully remarked in his memoirs that, apart from the occasional visiting speaker who had seen action, no attempt was made to discuss German training or tactics and “…what we could expect from the enemy was a closed book".
Infantry digging in near Rauray, 28 June ©IWM B 6225
A further concern, expressed many times in discussions among training officers was that infantry would fail to dig-in once an objective had been secured. In notes prepared for a discussion on battle discipline at the Infantry School Conference (see Article 3), the author complained that the average soldier would make do with “sleeping scrapes” when proper slit trenches were called for. The provision of tools to facilitate consolidation was also a topic of debate. Infantry Training stated that men were normally expected to carry a pick or a shovel as well as the standard entrenching tool into the attack, but it is clear that this advice was not observed consistently among 21st Army Group infantry units and practice varied widely. Lieutenant-Colonel Hart-Dyke was one officer who had the foresight to equip his men correctly for the conditions they would face. Before leaving England he ensured that a pick and a shovel had been obtained for every man in a rifle company: “They were so valued in Normandy that the men carved their initials on them”.
Unfortunately, there were also examples of when failure to carry the right tools had a serious effect on the ability of infantry to consolidate their hard won positions. In the attack by the South Saskatchewan Regiment on Verrieres Ridge on 20th July in the final phase of Operation Atlantic, the leading companies were able to reach their objectives and began to consolidate. However, before anti-tank guns could be brought forward, enemy infantry and armour overran the position. The commanding officer of ‘B’ Company, Major J.S. Edmonson, claimed in his account of the action that a contributory factor to the reverse was the failure to carry enough shovels to dig-in quickly. A Corporal from ‘D’ Company, giving a description of the same engagement agreed that a shovel issued to each man would have prevented many casualties.
There are many other examples where, because of the failure to dig-in adequately or due to delays in bringing up anti-tank guns and other support weapons, infantry were ejected from their objectives after determined German counterattacks. Captain Coleman, in a report of October 1944, looking for lessons that could be learned from various actions during the Normandy campaign, referred many times to the infantry’s shortcomings in effecting a speedy consolidation. Reviewing three separate engagements he noted “…provision must always be made to counter the enemy procedure of invariably counter-attacking” (Lessons from Tilly), “The necessity for taking measures to counter enemy infiltrating tactics following the successful occupation of enemy positions is again stressed” (Lessons from Caen) and “Steps must be taken to anticipate the vigorous counter attacks which a withdrawing enemy may inflict” (Lessons from Vire-Flers). Even at a comparably late stage in the campaign, combat analysts could still find examples of failures to deal adequately with very well known and understood German tactics and felt it worthwhile to comment on them as learning points for the future.
Infantry brewing up in a slit trench near Collombelles-sur-Orne, 27 June ©IWM B 6027
Examples of Infantry in Defence
However, despite the doctrinal confusion and the lack of training and preparation, it is fair to say that the infantry of 21st Army Group adapted to the technique of ‘bite and hold’ in the Normandy Campaign and it did bring them considerable success. The value of a robust defence against a German counter-attack was demonstrated at a very early stage in the fighting. For example, the Regina Rifle Regiment, operating as part of 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade, reached its objective of Bretteville-l’Orgueilleuse on 7th June and was able to prepare strong defensive positions, supported by guns of the 3rd Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery. When, on the next day, a strong counter-attack was launched by elements of the 12th SS Division, including Panther tanks, this was beaten off with heavy losses to the Germans. A further example was on 25th June when 1/4th Battalion The King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry attacked Tessel Wood as part of the opening moves of Operation MARTLET. After securing the objectives, the battalion dug in under a hot sun and, with support from Sherman tanks of 24th Lancers and anti-tank guns of 55th Anti-Tank Regiment, were able to repel a determined attack, again by 12th SS. On repeated occasions in Normandy, German counter-attacks floundered against seized objectives that had been adequately prepared for defence.
The importance of the ability of infantry units to resist repeated German counter-attacks can be well illustrated by the examination of battalion war diaries. The following excerpts are from the 6th Battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers war diary and cover the unit's involvement in operations EPSOM and GREENLINE: -
30 June Grainville
"The Bn was ordered to consolidate on line of rd GRAINVILLE to rd junc 896652, and Bn HQ, A & D Coys moved up. Orders were received that this line was to be denied against enemy attack".
1st July Grainville
"In the morning, at approx 0700 hrs, the enemy attacked with tks. The attack came in on C Coy's front and on the unit of the fmn on the right. A grim battle ensued in the course of which several enemy tks were knocked out. Eventually, however, through superiority in numbers and armament, all a/tk guns in the sector were knocked out and C Coy forced back. A gallant stand was made however on the Coy HQ line by Capt NC ROLLO and the remaining elements of C Coy. Acts of outstanding bravery were also performed by Capt J ELLIOT and Cpl WALLACE, both of whom continued to man and operate a/tk guns when the crews were killed until the guns were knocked out by direct hits. A few enemy tks succeeded in infiltrating round the right flank where the fmn on the right had fallen back, but the stand of C Coy prevented this taking place long enough for a strong armd counterattack to be put in in the evening which succeeded in restoring the situation".
16 July Tourville area
"A and C Coys reached their objectives 0030 hrs. B and D Coys then set off from the SL for their objectives which were 918609 and 927603 respectively, and at 0235 hrs Bn HQ then moved to 928615, and commenced digging in. Phase SHUFFLE was then ordered and carried out. 8RS commenced their attack on our right and succeeded in attaining their objectives. D Coy discovered at dawn that it had penetrated too far fwd and was more or less cut off. After a prolonged and difficult action it succeeded in disengaging and tying up its flanks. For the whole of the remainder of the day the Bn held grimly on to these posns in spite of counter attacks and also aerial attack".
17 July
"All day the posn was held in spite of counter attack and mortaring which became very bad indeed".
18 July
"Intermittent counter-attacks during the day all of which were successfully broken up by our arty fire which took a hy toll".
Defensive positions set up immediately after evicting the enemy would be 'hasty', meaning that infantrymen would dig the smallest hole that would give protection and enable them to use their weapons. If the defence became prolonged, trenches would be deepened and the position gradually adjusted and improved.
Troops east of Caen 18th July ©IWM B 7514
The Value of Consolidation
There can be little doubt that ‘bite and hold’ tactics were effective for 21st Army Group in Normandy and they were probably responsible for inflicting the most losses on the enemy. Battle experience questionnaires completed by Canadian officers who fought in NW Europe revealed that just over 70% thought that their units had been able to organise a rapid defence against counter-attack. Infantry seldom received assistance from the Royal Engineers in the preparation of positions but they did not need to be often told to get slit trenches dug quickly. Battle experience soon taught men that they had to “dig or die”. A sergeant of the Highland Light Infantry, whose battalion were occupying a defensive position near Mondrainville at the end of June, commented: -
“…the shovel had become a mighty weapon of war, a treasure to be hoarded carefully lest it be snatched up by some pilferer: being without a shovel left one feeling as naked as a man in Piccadilly without his trousers”.
Some enterprising soldiers attempted to use hand grenades to speed up the excavation process, with varying degrees of success. The lessons of combat brought home the benefits of prompt consolidation to officers and men alike, conferring to the occupiers of the ubiquitous slit trenches some element of physical security and giving them the best possible chance to deal with the attentions of the enemy.
It should be evident from the above that the preparation of infantry units to conduct ‘bite and hold’ operations in Normandy was not as thorough as it should have been. Senior commanders were in agreement that this tactical approach would be the key to inflicting severe attrition on the enemy, yet in training not enough attention was paid to the defensive techniques required to accomplish it. Also, the provision of entrenching tools was not consistent and was still the subject of debate on the eve of invasion. Ultimately, however, ‘bite and hold’ tactics produced rich dividends for 21st Army Group. The learning process was not smooth or consistent, and mistakes were still being made relatively late in the campaign, but the majority of infantry units were able to adapt to the necessary methods as the fighting progressed.