Wyre Forest Gamers - Infantry and Armour Cooperation (2)

The British & Canadian Infantry in Normandy 1944

Infantry and Armour Cooperation (2) - Performance in Battle

The bibliography for this series of articles is available here

Infantry riding on Sherman east of Caen July 44, ©IWM B 7511

Inadequate Preparation

Much has been made of the deficiencies in Allied armour during the Normandy campaign, certainly in terms of firepower and protection. However, it was only a minority of German vehicles that enjoyed significant advantages in these respects. The more serious problems faced by British and Canadian tanks on the offensive were the difficulties in locating enemy positions and coordinating with accompanying infantry units. Preparation for joint operations was far from ideal in the run up to the invasion. There had been significant modifications in doctrine over a relatively short period of time, resulting in confusion and the lack of a consistent approach to tactics. This issue was exacerbated by the flexible interpretation of doctrine, permitted in the army at this time, that prevailed in tank and infantry units and formations.

Training in the UK was also seriously deficient. Many infantry units had never worked alongside tanks in tactical exercises, those that had were unlikely to maintain the relationship under combat conditions and the armoured divisions were not consistent in their use of the integral infantry brigade and motor battalion. Given the doctrinal confusion, the overall lack of training and the difficulties experienced once the campaign was underway, it is not surprising that, from a tactical perspective, cooperation between infantry and armour started poorly.

Early experience in Normandy showed it was not generally a good idea for tanks to lead an attack and allow a significant gap to open up between themselves and following infantry. The attack by 6^th Green Howards and 4^th/7^th Royal Dragoon Guards on Cristot, June 11^th,against an enemy defending in depth and exercising good fire control discipline, demonstrated what the consequences could be. Waves of leading tanks got separated from their accompanying infantry. The Germans, lying low, let the tanks pass to be taken care of by anti-tank guns and then engaged the British troops. In the confused fighting that followed, only two tanks returned and the attackers had to withdraw. Infantry and tank units that were thrown into action together for the first time without any opportunity for training beforehand found effective collaboration problematic.

Infantry with Churchill late June, © IWM B 6124

The Practical Difficulties

There were a number of factors that made close cooperation between infantry and tanks difficult in Normandy and thus placed enormous strains on their working relationship. Both arms found adaptation to the physical conditions of terrain, weather and visibility difficult to come to terms with and it was some time before acclimatisation took place. The challenging environment added to the problems of communication between infantry and armour, which was never easy in battle conditions. All tanks found it very hard to locate enemy positions with accuracy and, because of the deafening noise inside the vehicle, also had trouble hearing what was going on outside. Wireless contact with infantry was rarely established effectively and the telephones that were attached to a minority of armoured vehicles in Normandy proved to be a disappointment. Thus, tanks stumbled half-blind across the battlefield and infantry found it hard to make them aware of dangers and opportunities.

Infantrymen also had an ambivalent attitude to the value of armour, amounting almost to a love-hate relationship. The presence of tanks in the attack was usually a great morale boost to the infantry alongside them and the ability of armoured vehicles to take out an enemy position with a well-aimed burst of machine-gun fire was deeply appreciated. However, there was always the possibility that their presence would attract enemy fire to which the infantry would be much more vulnerable than the tank crews enjoying armoured protection. There was also a feeling among the officers and men of infantry regiments that tank commanders were timid and over-cautious. Brigadier Hargest observed, in his notes of 17^th June, that a well-concealed tank of 8^th Armoured Brigade had refused to engage enemy vehicles because to do so would have provoked retaliatory fire. All tank crews had a healthy fear of anti-tank weapons, particularly the hand-held Panzerfaust, and would often be reluctant to move forward until infantry had ensured that the area was clear. One other issue also served to sour relations between infantry and armour – the large number of incidents where tanks inadvertently opened fire on their own troops, inflicting casualties and greatly damaging morale. Accusations that tank crews were ‘trigger happy’ or responsible for ‘indiscriminate fire’ appear often in personal accounts of the fighting. Many infantrymen believed that the presence of armour was a liability.

Area of attack of 2nd Glasgow Highlanders and B Squadron 7th RTR on 26th June in Operation EPSOM (Creative Commons Licence)

To illustrate some of the issues discussed above, and in the previous article, let us look at an example of infantry/tank cooperation on the opening day of Operation EPSOM (26th June). The 2nd Glasgow Highlanders, starting north of Le Mesnil-Patry, were given the task of taking the village of Cheux and then advancing to the 100 metre ring contour to the south-east of the village. They were supported by B Squadron 7th Royal Tank Regiment (equipped with Churchills). Both units had arrived in France a few days earlier (the last of the Highlander's vehicles had come ashore at 18:00hrs 24th June, the tanks had landed a day before the infantry) so there had been no time for familiarisation between the two arms. The attack commenced at 07:30hrs. The close countryside prevented the tanks from accompanying the infantry in their initial advance so they had to join up en route. When they did, it became clear that radio contact was not possible as none of the infantry's 38 Wireless sets functioned correctly (radio nets had not been checked at the forming-up point). Nevertheless, both units pressed on although the terrain hampered progress, the infantry moving through woods and hedgerows, the tanks sticking to open fields.

Around 08:00hrs the tanks entered a minefield 400 yards south of Le Mesnil-Patry and four were lost. The infantry companies pressed on while the armour was left behind and, after a pause for re-organisation on the Fontenay road, D Company, despite having suffered many casualties, resumed the advance and entered Cheux completely unsupported. The RTR tanks reached the Fontenay road at approximately 10:30hrs and, after both CO's had conferred, waited there until B and C Companies had joined D Company in the village. Whether this was because the infantry was encountering only light resistance or because the squadron was concerned about the threat from anti-tank weapons is not clear from contemporary accounts. The tanks then moved forward into the village and took up defensive positions until six pounder anti-tank guns could be brought forward.

Churchill and infantry at St Pierre Torentaine August, ©IWM B 8567

Responding to the Problems

Fighting units became more familiar with the Normandy terrain and weather as the campaign progressed and modified their tactics in line with experience. Efforts to improve the communication between infantry and tanks in the attack received attention on and off the battlefield. The AORG conducted an investigation into the issue and reported their conclusions in November 1944. Acknowledging that the problem was a difficult one, and that current doctrine and practice were unsatisfactory, the memorandum recommended that when oral communication could not be established by radio or tank telephone, a combination of flares, grenades and yellow tracer should be used to inform tanks of the enemy’s whereabouts. The report also stressed the need for a common approach and that the method agreed on should not be used for any other purpose. In the field, infantry were adopting similar techniques to improve communication with armour. Tracer fire, smoke and flares were all used to indicate German positions to tanks and some officers even claimed to have thrown rocks or handfuls of earth to attract a tank commander’s attention.

As infantry and armour worked together and gained battle experience, a mutual understanding of each other’s strengths and limitations developed. Rifle platoons going forward needed tanks to neutralise enemy machine-gun emplacements, advancing armour needed infantry to deal with Germans equipped with anti-tank weapons. The reality of combat itself forced the two arms to cooperate more closely.

Sherman covering infantry moving forward June, ©IWM B 5979

Leading from the front?

Despite the improvements made by infantry and armour in the use of terrain and mutual cooperation in the field, the vexed question of who should lead the attack remained. The attack on Cristot, referred to above, demonstrated that tanks leading the assault without close infantry support would be at a grave disadvantage when the enemy defence was well organised. However, if the opposition was weak or poorly organised, attacks by tanks without infantry support could be successful. At just after 11:00hrs on the opening day of Operation BLUECOAT (30th July), the 3rd Scots Guards of 6th Guards Tank Brigade set off for its objectives of Les Loges and Hill 226 without the 2nd Argylls infantry battalion, who had been delayed by nearby fighting. There was not much resistance and after pausing for an hour in the vain hope that the infantry would catch up, the squadrons pressed on and took both of the positions. The Argylls did not arrive until 15:30hrs.

Instances of tanks leading the attack were, however, comparatively rare. In the majority of cases where infantry and armour combined in Normandy, infantry were in the lead. The responses by Canadian officers in the post-war battle experience questionnaire are revealing. Those officers in the Northwest European Theatre of Operations who took part in joint arm actions were asked "Did you move in front of, behind, or amongst the tanks?'. The answers were: -

In Front 43.0%
Behind 12.7%
Amongst 17.7%
In all the above 19.0%
No answer 7.6%

A common cause of frustration among infantrymen was the perceived reluctance of tank crews to expose themselves to enemy fire and their preference to stay back and provide fire support from a safe position. This had a negative effect on the morale of the rifle companies who often lost touch with the armour and then got pinned down by enemy fire which could have been dealt with had the tanks been closer. There was some sympathy for crews equipped with Shermans or Cromwells because of their weak armour but the issue was still prevalent with the more heavily protected Churchills, which were almost as vulnerable when faced with high-velocity 75mm or 88mm German anti-tank guns. The account given by Sergeant Trevor Greenwood of C Squadron of 9th Royal Tank Regiment of the attack on Maltot on the afternoon of 10th July illustrates this perfectly: -

Infantry inspect a knocked-out Tiger 28 June, ©IWM B 6140

"We were scheduled to launch a further attack on Maltot with fresh infantry (4th Dorsets)...we plastered the woods around Maltot with MG and plenty of HE...The infantry seemed to have little difficulty in entering the woods and so down to the village. We did not follow: remaining on the high ground on the alert for enemy armour. We knew that there were at least three Panthers in the village, or in the vicinity"

The tanks stayed on the ridge for some time while the infantry, desperate for additional fire support, struggled to take the objective. The squadron was then attacked by Tigers firing from Hill 112 and, after suffering losses, started to lay smoke: -

"Soon I couldn't see a thing but smoke, but gave the driver orders to advance: better go anywhere than stay and be shot up. Eventually found my way back to lower ground away from the danger zone....Very soon, infantry appeared running towards us and away from Maltot". (Greenwood pp84-86)

However, there are also many examples of when infantry and armour worked in close collaboration and provided mutual support. The action on 17th June by the Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry in support of 147 Brigade around Cristot illustrates this well. A tank commander from C Squadron recalled: -

"So far most of the action had been in front of us and we had not yet opened fire. Then an infantry officer frantically called to us to support him in a small apple orchard. His men were in a ditch at the edge of the orchard, held up by enemy infantry in a hedgerow a hundred yards to their front. Our three Shermans went in with all guns blazing. The Germans retreated to another hedgerow further back and our infantry moved forward". (Hills, pp93-94)

The attack of 1^st Highland Light Infantry of Canada on Buron (8^th July), supported by Sherman tanks of the Sherbrooke Fusiliers was another example of the ability of armour to neutralise German machine-gun positions that were then mopped-up by the infantry. It also showed that, in the right circumstances, it was possible for the Sherman to fulfil the infantry tank role.

The infantry could provide equally valuable service to the tank crews. In mid-August, as part of the attempt to close the Falaise gap, B squadron 9th Royal Tank Regiment was supporting infantry in an evening advance. The wireless operator in the leading tank recounted: -

"We set off during the evening with infantry up front. When it became dusk we heard a bang on the side of the tank. It was an infantryman with his rifle butt. 'Advance very slowly', he said. 'We believe there is an 88 anti-tank gun somewhere up front'"

The Churchill then came under fire and experienced two near-misses. The tank laid smoke and the crew waited nervously for the next shot: -

"The third shot never arrived. After what seemed like an eternity, an infantry officer jumped on board with 'OK boys, 88 silenced'. After that we could never be grateful enough for the infantry" (Beale, pp92-93)

There is also evidence that, at a minor tactical level, lessons were being learned and different approaches considered. Methods of attack were being formulated in which infantry and armour worked in close collaboration, delivering the maximum amount of firepower to key areas on the battlefield while, at the same time, reducing the number of men exposed to the most extreme danger to a minimum. A report compiled in October 1944 includes a drill for infantry/tank cooperation in Bocage country, describing a battalion attack using a road as a central line with one or two companies up, each company with one platoon forward. A troop of tanks would be in support of each forward platoon, moving up with two leading tanks providing covering fire for infantry from hedge to hedge with the remaining tanks providing support to the lead tanks. This approach had noticeable similarities to the methods adopted by Hart-Dyke and Taylor (see previous articles) as all were based on the premise of reducing the number of men at the sharp end of an attack. It would also have the effect of massively increasing the amount of small arms firepower available to the rifle platoons which was, as we have seen, a prime objective of many infantry commanders. All the main British and Canadian battle tanks carried two machine-guns and several thousand rounds of ammunition and they could be used with devastating effect in a close support role.

The Armoured Divisions

All the armoured divisions encountered difficulties early on in the employment of infantry in close partnership with armour. Following the chastening experiences of Operations EPSOM and GOODWOOD, both the Guards Armoured and 11^th Armoured Divisions instituted far-reaching organisational changes designed to increase flexibility and improve the coordination of infantry and tanks. In preparation for Operation BLUECOAT, Major-General Roberts divided 11^th Armoured into three regimental groups, each of an infantry battalion and a tank regiment. Guards Armoured also effected a reorganisation into mixed infantry/tank formations, though not perhaps as comprehensive as that achieved by 11^th Armoured. A consequence of these changes was a shortage of suitable motorised transport for the infantry that were to accompany the tanks. For this reason, the tanks themselves were utilised as the means of transporting the rifle companies. The use of tank riders had previously been considered exceptional and a last resort, however, in the circumstances it was, at least on a temporary basis, a justified expedient.

A step towards a more permanent solution to the problem of providing infantry with secure transportation and full cross-country capability was taken with the introduction of the Kangaroo armoured personnel carrier. These vehicles, first used in Operation TOTALIZE in early August, were conversions of the Priest self-propelled gun and, although they were open topped, were fully tracked and provided a good deal of protection from small arms fire.

The Churchill Crocodile

The Crocodile was a Mark VII Churchill with a flamethrower on the front hull and a towed trailer containing fuel for the weapon. The flamethrower had a range of about 100 yards and was designed to be used against pillboxes, strong points, houses and trench lines. The tank also had a profound psychological impact on the enemy. Lessons were learned early in the campaign about its use in battle. At first the vehicles were employed singly but it was soon discovered that they were much more effective when deployed in groups and in cooperation with other arms. The entry in the war diary of 141st Regiment Royal Armoured Corps listed the following principles in their use: -

"(a) The first essential of any plan entailing the use of crocodiles is to ensure they are got to within 80 yards of the objective to be flamed - this entails armour protection to the flanks, artillery and smoke.

(b) Very clear signals must be laid down between the infantry and supporting crocodiles.

(c) The infantry must follow the crocodiles in or the enemy will return immediately".

Just how effective they could be was displayed during the clearing of May-Sur-Orne on 8 August by 1^st Battalion Fusiliers Mont Royal supported by Crocodiles of 141^st RAC. Each tank moved forward with two sections of infantry close behind, using its 75mm gun to knock a hole in the nearest house, then squirting flame into the aperture. One section of infantry then dashed into the building and cleared the house as quickly as possible. Meanwhile, the tank would move on and repeat the process with the second section following. One historian has called this operation a “…textbook example of the clearance of a built up area by infantry supported by flame-throwing tanks” (Reid p229)

At the start of the Normandy campaign, 21^st Army Group found itself poorly prepared to achieve a good level of cooperation between infantry and armoured units, due to confusion over doctrine and inadequate training. The problems were compounded by the difficulties presented by terrain, weather and communication, all of which had a detrimental impact on the working relationship of the two arms. It was only through a process of trail and error, and a gradually deepening realisation that infantrymen and tanks were mutually dependent, that more effective cooperation was achieved.

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