Much has been made of the deficiencies in Allied armour during the Normandy campaign, certainly in terms of firepower and protection. However, it was only a minority of German vehicles that enjoyed significant advantages in these respects. The more serious problems faced by British and Canadian tanks on the offensive were the difficulties in locating enemy positions and coordinating with accompanying infantry units. Preparation for joint operations was far from ideal in the run up to the invasion. There had been significant modifications in doctrine over a relatively short period of time, resulting in confusion and the lack of a consistent approach to tactics. This issue was exacerbated by the flexible interpretation of doctrine, permitted in the army at this time, that prevailed in tank and infantry units and formations.

Training in the UK was also seriously deficient. Many infantry units had never worked alongside tanks in tactical exercises, those that had were unlikely to maintain the relationship under combat conditions and the armoured divisions were not consistent in their use of the integral infantry brigade and motor battalion. Given the doctrinal confusion, the overall lack of training and the difficulties experienced once the campaign was underway, it is not surprising that, from a tactical perspective, cooperation between infantry and armour started poorly.

There were a number of factors that made close cooperation between infantry and tanks difficult in Normandy and thus placed enormous strains on their working relationship. Both arms found adaptation to the physical conditions of terrain, weather and visibility difficult to come to terms with and it was some time before acclimatisation took place. The challenging environment added to the problems of communication between infantry and armour, which was never easy in battle conditions. All tanks found it very hard to locate enemy positions with accuracy and, because of the deafening noise inside the vehicle, also had trouble hearing what was going on outside. Wireless contact with infantry was rarely established effectively and the telephones that were attached to a minority of armoured vehicles in Normandy proved to be a disappointment. Thus, tanks stumbled half-blind across the battlefield and infantry found it hard to make them aware of dangers and opportunities.

Fighting units became more familiar with the Normandy terrain and weather as the campaign progressed and modified their tactics in line with experience. Efforts to improve the communication between infantry and tanks in the attack received attention on and off the battlefield. The AORG conducted an investigation into the issue and reported their conclusions in November 1944. Acknowledging that the problem was a difficult one, and that current doctrine and practice were unsatisfactory, the memorandum recommended that when oral communication could not be established by radio or tank telephone, a combination of flares, grenades and yellow tracer should be used to inform tanks of the enemy’s whereabouts. The report also stressed the need for a common approach and that the method agreed on should not be used for any other purpose. In the field, infantry were adopting similar techniques to improve communication with armour. Tracer fire, smoke and flares were all used to indicate German positions to tanks and some officers even claimed to have thrown rocks or handfuls of earth to attract a tank commander’s attention.

As infantry and armour worked together and gained battle experience, a mutual understanding of each other’s strengths and limitations developed. Rifle platoons going forward needed tanks to neutralise enemy machine-gun emplacements, advancing armour needed infantry to deal with Germans equipped with anti-tank weapons. The reality of combat itself forced the two arms to cooperate more closely.

Despite the improvements made by infantry and armour in the use of terrain and mutual cooperation in the field, the vexed question of who should lead the attack remained. The attack on Cristot, referred to above, demonstrated that tanks leading the assault without close infantry support would be at a grave disadvantage when the enemy defence was well organised. However, if the opposition was weak or poorly organised, attacks by tanks without infantry support could be successful. At just after 11:00hrs on the opening day of Operation BLUECOAT (30th July), the 3rd Scots Guards of 6th Guards Tank Brigade set off for its objectives of Les Loges and Hill 226 without the 2nd Argylls infantry battalion, who had been delayed by nearby fighting. There was not much resistance and after pausing for an hour in the vain hope that the infantry would catch up, the squadrons pressed on and took both of the positions. The Argylls did not arrive until 15:30hrs.

All the armoured divisions encountered difficulties early on in the employment of infantry in close partnership with armour. Following the chastening experiences of Operations EPSOM and GOODWOOD, both the Guards Armoured and 11^th Armoured Divisions instituted far-reaching organisational changes designed to increase flexibility and improve the coordination of infantry and tanks. In preparation for Operation BLUECOAT, Major-General Roberts divided 11^th Armoured into three regimental groups, each of an infantry battalion and a tank regiment. Guards Armoured also effected a reorganisation into mixed infantry/tank formations, though not perhaps as comprehensive as that achieved by 11^th Armoured. A consequence of these changes was a shortage of suitable motorised transport for the infantry that were to accompany the tanks. For this reason, the tanks themselves were utilised as the means of transporting the rifle companies. The use of tank riders had previously been considered exceptional and a last resort, however, in the circumstances it was, at least on a temporary basis, a justified expedient.

The Crocodile was a Mark VII Churchill with a flamethrower on the front hull and a towed trailer containing fuel for the weapon. The flamethrower had a range of about 100 yards and was designed to be used against pillboxes, strong points, houses and trench lines. The tank also had a profound psychological impact on the enemy. Lessons were learned early in the campaign about its use in battle. At first the vehicles were employed singly but it was soon discovered that they were much more effective when deployed in groups and in cooperation with other arms. The entry in the war diary of 141st Regiment Royal Armoured Corps listed the following principles in their use: -

"(a) The first essential of any plan entailing the use of crocodiles is to ensure they are got to within 80 yards of the objective to be flamed - this entails armour protection to the flanks, artillery and smoke.

(b) Very clear signals must be laid down between the infantry and supporting crocodiles.

(c) The infantry must follow the crocodiles in or the enemy will return immediately".

Just how effective they could be was displayed during the clearing of May-Sur-Orne on 8 August by 1^st Battalion Fusiliers Mont Royal supported by Crocodiles of 141^st RAC. Each tank moved forward with two sections of infantry close behind, using its 75mm gun to knock a hole in the nearest house, then squirting flame into the aperture. One section of infantry then dashed into the building and cleared the house as quickly as possible. Meanwhile, the tank would move on and repeat the process with the second section following. One historian has called this operation a “…textbook example of the clearance of a built up area by infantry supported by flame-throwing tanks” (Reid p229)