Wyre Forest Gamers - Infantry and Armour Cooperation (1)

The British & Canadian Infantry in Normandy 1944

Infantry and Armour Cooperation (1) - Doctrine and Training

The bibliography for this series of articles is available here

Churchill tanks on exercise January 1942, ©IWM H 16957

The Development of Tactical Doctrine

This article is chiefly concerned with the evolution of tactical thought, formulated in the years preceding the cross-channel invasion, concerning the cooperation of infantry and tanks on the battlefield. However, to give some context, I will provide a very brief overview of British armoured vehicle development and the role of the armoured division in battle.

British armoured doctrine in the Second World War was based on the belief, formulated in the inter-war years, that two main types of tank would be required to meet different needs on the battlefield. The fast moving and lightly armoured cruiser tank was intended to seek out enemy tanks, eliminate them and then exploit resulting opportunities. The heavily armoured and slow moving infantry tank was required to support foot soldiers in the assault of strongly defended enemy locations. The cruisers were organised into independent armoured brigades and armoured divisions, the infantry tanks into independent tank brigades. By the start of the Normandy campaign the armoured brigades consisted of the imported U.S. M4 Sherman and the home-produced A27M Cromwell tanks, the tank brigades the A22 Churchill.

As the war progressed, a good deal of thought was given to how armoured divisions should be utilised. In mid 1942, divisional organisation was changed and one of the two armoured brigades was replaced by an infantry brigade. Lessons had been learned in the Western Desert where many tanks had been lost because of their inability to deal with the threat of infantry and anti-tank guns. However, it was still expected that the infantry component of the division would be kept separate from the armour. A single motor battalion remained attached to the armoured brigade but, because this unit was transported on lorries, it too was unable to keep up with the armour (the situation somewhat improved immediately prior to the Normandy campaign when the motor battalions were equipped with M3/M5 halftracks). Throughout 1943, the three-part Military Training Pamphlet (MTP) No. 41 The Tactical Handling of the Armoured Division and its Components was issued which confirmed the separated infantry and armoured brigade approach.

Valentines under fire on exercise December 1941, ©IWM H 16226

Away from the armoured divisions, doctrine governing infantry/armour cooperation went through several modifications after the Dunkirk evacuation. The first significant pronouncement on the subject came in March 1941 with the publication of Army Training Instruction (ATI) No. 2 The Employment of Army Tanks in Cooperation with Infantry. The method of attack was described as follows - a first echelon of infantry tanks, covered by artillery fire, would ignore weakly held forward defences and move on to deal with the deep defences. A second echelon of tanks would then engage the forward defensive line and infantry would follow behind them. This would mean a gap of up to 1000 yards between the infantry and the tank echelons. A reserve of both arms would then follow.

This approach had produced early success against Italian forces in Africa as they lacked an anti-tank weapon to deal effectively with the Matilda infantry tank. Unfortunately for the British, Operations BATTLEAXE (June 1941) and CRUSADER (November, December 1941) convincingly demonstrated the vulnerability of infantry tanks to German anti-tank guns. A more flexible approach was required and units training in the UK began to experiment. On some exercises, infantry were deployed between the first and second tank echelons (sandwich formation) and the gap between infantry and tanks was shortened to 400 yards.

These tactics were set down in some detail in the Instructor's Handbook of October 1942, in Section 35 The Platoon in Attack Against Highly Organised Resistance. The manual envisaged an attack on a narrow front, preceded by a heavy concentration of artillery fire. A small group of engineers would move forward to clear mines and the first echelon of tanks would break through by speed and sheer weight of numbers. Then, working closely with tanks in the second echelon to deal with enemy strong points and machine guns, infantry were to “move forward conforming to the ground in section files, each section making the best use of ground within the limits of the area allocated to it”. It was suggested that the platoon would advance in three section lines, the platoon HQ behind the leading section. On coming under fire, the whole platoon was to get down in a 'fire line' and return fire. The tanks would then go forward to suppress enemy defences which were then cleared by the infantry going forward in groups. The infantry would then resume single file, or another appropriate formation, and resume the advance. A third echelon of infantry and tanks would then move forward for exploitation. The manual made it clear that infantry in the second echelon should be in front of the accompanying tanks but did not specify the ideal distance between infantry and the tanks in the first echelon. Note that, despite the imposition of the 'sandwich formation', the 'tanks first' approach was upheld in this training material.

51st Highland Division training at Battle School May 1942, ©IWM H 19515

Doctrinal Confusion

In May 1943, ATI No. 2 was completely revised. Largely based on combat experience in Tunisia, the new guidelines adopted a more nuanced approach to armour/infantry collaboration. Rather than dictating that a particular arm should always lead the assault, the pamphlet encouraged adaptability and mutual understanding. The importance of concentration, attacking on a narrow front and clearing mines and obstacles was reaffirmed. However, operations were now broken down into phases, each phase dictating which tactics were to be employed. The penetration phase involved infantry and engineers being pushed forward under covering fire. A number of tanks would stand off and provide additional fire support where possible and then tanks and infantry would press forward. In the development phase tanks and infantry, cooperating closely, would assault rearward areas. Finally, the exploitation phase would commence as combat became more fluid and enemy defences crumbled. This approach obviously placed a great deal of responsibility on the shoulders of junior commanders but, with time and training, there was no reason why such tactics should not produce successful outcomes.

However, two developments occurred which compromised this objective. By the second half of 1943 it became clear that Churchill tank production would only be sufficient to equip three of the eight independent tank brigades earmarked for the invasion. The remaining five brigades were forced to take the M4 Sherman, which had not been designed for the close infantry support role. In response to this, a group of senior 21st Army Group officers, led by Brigadier Harold Pyman, produced the pamphlet “The Cooperation of Tanks with Infantry Divisions in Offensive Operations” in November 1943. The modified doctrine proposed that the Sherman should not (because of its weak armour) be used in close infantry support, but as a self-propelled gun and remain well back in the advance, using its dual-purpose 75mm weapon to shoot infantry on to the target.

The second development was the appointment of General Montgomery as 21st Army Group Commander in January 1944. Monty was convinced that the army should end the distinction between cruiser and infantry tanks and adopt a single 'capital tank'. He saw no reason, therefore, why the Sherman and the Churchill could not fulfil the same infantry support role. He was also unhappy with Pyman's pamphlet because it created further confusion in doctrine and training and he wanted to impose a simpler approach. In November 1943, Eighth Army had produced a document on infantry/tank cooperation which reiterated that, after minefields had been cleared, only tanks should lead the assault and the sandwich formation described in the Instructor's Handbook should then be adopted. The pamphlet “Notes on the Employment of Tanks in Support of Infantry in Battle”, issued by 21^st Army Group in February 1944, (virtually an identical copy of the Eighth Army document) confirmed this position. When the official War Office publication MTP No.63 “The Co-Operation of Tanks with Infantry Divisions” appeared in May 1944, the organisation of an attack was described thus: -

"When the ground and obstacles permit, tanks will normally form the leading wave of the assault echelon to neutralize the enemy on the objective until the arrival of the infantry. In such a case the infantry should arrive as quickly as possible after the tanks which, if required to remain exposed on an objective...are likely to suffer serious casualties from anti-tank fire. It follows that when tanks form the leading wave of the assault echelon, infantry will generally form the second wave."

In the pamphlet there were no references to tanks standing off and giving remote support to infantry.

Matilda tank acting as enemy armour October 1941, ©IWM H 14956

In the twelve months before D-Day there had been four separate pronouncements on infantry/armour cooperation (admittedly, MTP No.63 probably arrived too late to have much impact) and despite Montgomery's effort to impose a simple, unified approach, 21st Army Group doctrine was in a state of flux at the time of the invasion. Compounding the problem was the culture of doctrinal flexibility (mentioned in Article 2) that existed in the British and Canadian armies at the time. Units and formations largely went their own ways when it came to the interpretation and enforcement of doctrine, despite the injunctions in the official publications that a common approach was essential. There was no guarantee that the training pamphlets would be read by all commanders, or that their contents would be considered relevant by those that did. Veteran units tended to regard lessons learned in action as more important guides to conduct in battle than War Office publications. Thus, for the British and Canadian armies there was no single, consistently imposed method of infantry/armour cooperation in place at the start of the Normandy campaign. This confusion possibly explains why Infantry Training Manual Part VIII – Fieldcraft, Battle Drill, Section and Platoon Tactics, issued in March 1944, provided no instructions on how infantry were to combine with tanks in the assault.

The uncertainty of which tactical approach to adopt was not confined to junior commanders. Lieutenant-General Harry Crerar, GOC 1st Canadian Army, included the following observations on infantry/armour cooperation in an address made on 14th May 1944: -

"The tank is strong against the small arms fire of infantry, and against ordinary mortar and artillery fire. It is weak when opposed by anti-tank guns and other anti-tank weapons. The infantry is strong against the enemies of the tank, but weak in face of small arms fire, HE bombs and shells.

On this basis, the question of which arm should lead the other in the attack has but one sensible answer - the arm which can best get forward and close with the enemy in the circumstances of the particular time and place. This is a situation which may change several times in the course of one attack. The essential is for each arm to recognise the changing circumstances and fully understand the part which it is then required to play".

This flexible approach was the one set out in ATI No. 2 in May 1943. So much for Montgomery's intention, expressed before Crerar's address, that tanks should lead the attack.

Training

Exercises in the UK were often used to trial new ideas as lessons were learned after combat in overseas theatres. As mentioned above, after the unhappy experiences in the Western Desert, some formations in the UK (for example, 43rd Division working with 34th Tank Brigade) employed the sandwich formation in infantry/armour training, encouraged vehicle manoeuvre rather than direct advance and stressed the importance of the infantry giving fire support against anti-tank positions. It was often the case, therefore that training in practice was in advance of published doctrine. However, when doctrine did catch up with training, some tank brigades did not think it necessary to follow the advice contained in the official pamphlets. In August 1943 (after the publication of the second version of ATI No. 2), 6th Guards Tank Brigade took part in exercise CATTERICK in support of 44th Infantry Brigade. In the plan of attack, the assault echelon (comprised entirely of tanks) was to move forward approximately one mile and engage the enemy while the support echelon (infantry and tanks) waited for 35 minutes before crossing the start line. This approach was much more in line with the 1941 version of ATI No. 2.

The School of Infantry featured prominently in training foot soldiers to collaborate with armour. The school had an attached squadron of Churchills and a demonstration infantry battalion to try out various tactical ideas. One of these was the suggestion that infantry tanks in the assault could move into the area covered by the initial artillery barrage while the shells were still falling. This would enable the tanks to get close enough to deal with enemy anti-tank guns still experiencing heavy neutralising fire, albeit at the expense of some losses to their own number. Research carried out at the School of Artillery at Larkhill indicated that tank casualties would be acceptable and the tactic was endorsed in the pamphlet Infantry Training Part 1: The Infantry Battalion (January 1944) but, in the event, this approach was never attempted in Normandy. The School of Infantry also conducted trials in the second half of 1942 in which tanks stayed back and supported the infantry advance by firing from hull-down positions, a tactic which was later advocated by Brigadier Pyman in late 1943 (see above). Despite these innovations, many instructors continued to believe that the psychological benefit to the infantry of having tanks lead the attack was justification enough to persist with this method.

Training infantry and armour to work together in close cooperation was not conducted in a systematic manner and the quality and duration varied greatly. As we have seen, doctrine changed frequently in the run up to the invasion and units and formations were left to interpret tactical pronouncements as they saw fit. This is not to say that all the training that went on between infantry and armoured units was without value. Units that had trained together in Britain, or had cooperated in the past and continued that relationship during the Normandy campaign, generally performed better than those that had not. However, in the campaign itself, it was not always operationally possible to keep together infantry and tank formations that that had been paired up at home for training purposes. The 51^st Highland Division had started joint schemes with 44^th Royal Tank Regiment but, in the event, they never fought side by side in Normandy. Regrettably, many infantry units had received no training alongside independent armoured or tank brigades and constant rotation and relocation in the field prevented the development of sound working relationships once the campaign had started. As one tank commander commented: -

"This was the horror of belonging to an independent armoured brigade - one changed hands from day to day like a library book. The regiment would be flung into battle at a moment's notice with infantry who had never had experience of cooperating with tanks. Then as soon as the infantry had been taught to work with us...we would be moved to support a different, strange formation" (quoted in Buckley, "Monty's Men" p131).

In some armoured divisions the view was that the tank brigade and the infantry brigade should operate separately and, as a consequence, no exercises involving the two together had taken place before embarkation to France. This unsatisfactory state of affairs did not bode well for successful collaboration. A significant number of lessons had to be learned and problems overcome as the campaign went on before cooperation between infantry and armour showed signs of improvement.

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