The most clear indication of the state of morale in the Commonwealth forces would be the proportion of losses due to psychiatric casualties. The catch-all term for these cases was 'battle exhaustion'. The use of the First World War term 'shell-shock' was considered inappropriate - as explained in the Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC) report completed in 1945, it was 'administratively desirable' that psychiatric cases of a usually temporary duration should not be labelled by tags which implied mental disease or damage to the nervous system. Battle exhaustion cases fell into four main groups: -

• Anxiety states

• Depressive states

• Conversion Hysteria (stammering, muteness, deafness, blindness and paralysis)

• Physical exhaustion or the concussive effects of explosions

Other indications of diminished fighting spirit in the men would be high levels of desertion, self-inflicted wounds (SIWs), drunkenness and insubordination.

It soon began to produce what appeared to be some very impressive results. Major Harold Palmer, in charge of a forward psychiatric unit in Tripoli from January 1943, claimed that of the 12000 patients he dealt with, 95% returned to full duty within a month and 98% within two months. In fact, only 30% of those soldiers went back to their units, the rest were posted elsewhere within Eighth Army. Nevertheless, such reports convinced General Adam at the end of 1943 that "...if the psychiatrists' assistance is sought quickly, the permanent loss from battle exhaustion will be negligible".

Not all senior government and military personnel shared the Adjutant-General's enthusiasm. Many were suspicious about the work of psychiatrists, indeed Churchill himself wrote in December 1942: -

"...it would be sensible to restrict as much as possible the work of these gentlemen, who are capable of doing an immense amount of harm with what may very easily degenerate into charlatanry".

The mere presence of psychiatrists at the front would, it was feared, diminish the fighting spirit of the men. If soldiers knew that a 'psychiatric escape route' was available, the danger was that many would simulate a breakdown in order to make use of it. A further concern among officers was, because psychiatrists were mainly recruited from civilian practice, they would sympathise with the soldier who wished to avoid death or injury rather than consider the need of the army to retain as many men as possible. Undeterred by these criticisms, the DAP saw the Normandy campaign as "...the ideal stage on which to present the skills of the army psychiatrist". (Jones & Ironside p110) It was hoped that measures put in place prior to the invasion would keep battle exhaustion cases to a minimum.

Another factor that encouraged many observers was the belief that the psychological impact of tactical training would make men less likely to succumb to battle exhaustion. We saw in Article 3 that battle inoculation training was an important component of the Battle School syllabus, with the aim of making soldiers better able to deal with the shocks and noises of war and cope with the physical and mental effects of fear. However, as we have seen, no amount of training could adequately prepare infantrymen for the realities of combat. The importance of sound leadership was also recognised. Because of improvements made in selection and training, it was hoped that junior officers and NCOs would maintain morale by their example in the field and thus win their subordinates' respect and confidence. Unfortunately, not all of them were up to the task. The other problem was that when an officer who was popular and well-regarded got seriously injured or killed, this often had a detrimental effect on the fighting spirit of the men under his command.

Once the campaign was underway, a further measure relied on to reduce the impact of psychological casualties was the 'forward psychiatry' approach or the P.I.E. method of treatment (proximity to combat, immediacy and expectation of recovery). The procedure was that the initial assessment of cases was to be undertaken by regimental medical officers (RMOs) in the field and soldiers deemed to suffering from combat induced stress would then be referred to an 'exhaustion centre' (one for each corps). Admissions were to be held for a maximum of 48 hours and, if not recovered, transferred to a special unit located in Bayeux (32 General [Psychiatric] Hospital) which would eventually contain 600 beds. Here, five days of treatment was considered enough to return most men to some form of duty, more difficult cases were then to be evacuated to the UK. In view of the large numbers of men referred to exhaustion centres and the length of time it took them to recover, the preparations seem, in hindsight, hopelessly inadequate. However, Lt.Col. Tom Main, the chief psychiatric adviser for 21st Army Group, was confident that rigorous selection, improved training and good leadership skills would ensure that battle exhaustion cases would be light (at least initially) and that recovery and return to the front-line would be rapid.

However, most attention was paid to reducing the number of men being referred to exhaustion centres. In some units, platoon commanders were ordered to send men showing signs of combat stress to the transport lines for rest rather than immediate referral to the medical facilities. On 3rd July the Deputy Director of Medical Services for 2nd Army told RMOs to examine exhaustion casualties with as much thoroughness as any other sick or wounded man with the aim of weeding out minor cases and malingerers. By the end of July, the policy aim was that no soldier suffering from stress should be allowed to leave the field without the permission of his commanding officer. These measures had some effect in bringing down the number of exhaustion referrals but it was the lessening intensity of the fighting and increasing success on the battlefield that were the chief reasons why psychiatric casualty numbers diminished - as the military position improved, so did morale.

Instances of self-inflicted wounds were also not a major issue for 21st Army Group commanders, at least statistically speaking. In the whole of British Army units serving overseas in 1944-45 only 208 soldiers were convicted of injuring themselves in order to avoid duty. However, this was a big increase on previous years and the higher prevalence of these incidents in Normandy led to the setting up of an inquiry into the matter. The investigation, conducted by Major A.T.A Browne, which reported in late August, also included cases of accidental woundings, so the figures have to be treated with caution. Browne found that the problem was mostly confined to the rifle companies, with 279 recorded infantry cases out of a total of 388, but concluded that there was no serious threat to morale from these increases. Nor does it appear that widespread drunkenness and insubordination were pressing problems in the British and Canadian armies. Some soldiers relied on alcohol for Dutch courage and local wine, cider and calvados (apple brandy) were widely available but these were used as occasional stimulants and not persistently imbibed.

In the cases of specific units, by far the most serious example was that of 6th Duke of Wellington's Regiment. The collapse in morale was so catastrophic that the CO, Lt-Colonel A.J.D. Turner claimed in his report that on two occasions he "...had to stand at the end of a track and draw my revolver on retreating men". However, as David French has pointed out, the battalion was the victim of a series of unlucky events which led to an extremely large number of officer and other rank losses in a very short period of time (23 officer and 350 OR casualties in 14 days) including 40 killed or injured by German shells when the regiment had been moved to a place of relative safety. Other units also exhibited fragile states of morale. Le Régiment de la Chaudière of Canadian 8 Brigade consistently displayed high rates of battle exhaustion, SIWs, desertion and AWOL. After its mauling at Carpiquet in early July it was thereafter handled with care, mainly in a support role. At sub-unit level there were numerous examples where companies and platoons suffered a temporary drop in morale only to recover relatively quickly and without reducing the effectiveness of the battalion as a whole. On 19th July the Canadian 5th Brigade's attack on Fleury-sur-Orne got off to a bad start when Le Régiment de Maisonneuve's two leading companies formed up on the opening line for their supporting barrage instead of their assigned start line. The result was that these companies took the full weight of 'friendly' shellfire, were demoralised and had to be evacuated. However, despite this the two remaining companies carried on with the attack and took the objective.

However, it is possible to draw some general conclusions. The concern expressed by Montgomery and others before D-Day about the fragile state of morale in the invasion force (see Article 1) was, to some extent, justified by events in Normandy. Forward psychiatry and the P.I.E. approach did have some beneficial impact - a 21st Army Group report claimed that, from 6th June to 25th July, 65% of exhaustion cases were returned to some form of duty, half of those to the front line. The number of psychiatric cases was probably overestimated in the first three weeks of the campaign and underestimated thereafter. The rifle companies were the units most affected by battle exhaustion, desertion and SIWs.

The main point is that, despite the alarms, worries and examples of units and formations performing below expectation in battle, poor morale never critically impacted on the fighting power of 21st Army Group. This is not to say that the gloom and disappointment that was prevalent in many infantry battalions (particularly after the failure of operations such as GOODWOOD and SPRING) had no effect on battlefield capability, merely that this did not reach the stage where men displayed mass disobedience or refused to fight. It is worth noting that the Army did some things very well in order to maintain morale. Ensuring that soldiers had good quantities of food rations was considered important and the the Army Catering Corps did sterling work in supplying regular hot meals to front line troops. Similarly, water rations and unlimited quantities of tea were crucial to the wellbeing of the British soldier and the government made sure that there was never less than 30 million tons of tea stored in English warehouses. One officer commented: -

"...if the supplies (of tea) had ever failed the morale of the army would have been reduced more than by a major defeat".

Although theoretically non-essential, the provision of cigarettes was also given a high priority by the high command. Most infantrymen were smokers in civilian life and, given the stress of military service, it would have been counter-productive to add to their psychological strain had they been denied cigarettes during active duty. Regular deliveries of mail were also vital in maintaining morale in all ranks though, of course, letters could contain bad news as well as good. Most importantly of all, regular rotation and rest from the front line was necessary to ensure that infantrymen had the chance to recuperate and recover from intense periods of action. The Army tried to make sure that, after units had been involved in heavy combat, they were removed from danger at least on a temporary basis. The importance of these interludes is well explained by Lieutenant Stuart Hills: -

"Whenever we came out of action...there was a feeling of exuberance in spite of the casualties...we knew that for a short spell the numbness would disappear from our minds and bodies and that, for a change, we could be human beings rather than automatons of destruction".

Fragile morale was a problem for 21st Army Group. Battle exhaustion, desertion and self-inflicted wounds did reduce manpower and diminish the fighting spirit of the Commonwealth forces, the infantry battalions especially. However, it never approached a crisis or seriously threatened the outcome of the campaign.