Wyre Forest Gamers - Battle Exhaustion

The British & Canadian Infantry in Normandy 1944

A Crisis in Morale? Battle Exhaustion, Desertion & Self-Inflicted Wounds

The bibliography for this series of articles is available here

Officer candidates take a psychometric test January 1944 ©IWM H35412

The Heavy Cost of Progress

Operation MARTLET (start date 25th June) was the first in a series of set-piece offensive operations, ending in Operation TRACTABLE (start date 14th August), that inflicted heavy attrition on 21st Army Group. Over those eight weeks, progress was pitifully slow and infantry casualties were very high. Because of the physical and mental strains placed on the men, many officers raised concerns about their morale and fighting spirit. The official New Zealand observer, Brigadier James Hargest, wrote on 10th July: -

"The morale of the infantry officer and soldier is not high. This applies to new troops as well as veterans...Even senior officers grumble about being too long in the line and have opinion that they are being 'used'".

Units, and whole formations were perceived to be failing. On 11th July the 6th Duke of Wellington's Regiment was sent back to England after its new CO reported that the battalion was not fit to take its place in the line. And four days later, Montgomery sent a telegram to Brooke complaining that 51st (Highland) Division was 'not battle worthy'. Pessimism and despair grew as the month wore on and it appeared to many that there was a morale crisis in 21st Army Group which threatened the whole enterprise.

The most clear indication of the state of morale in the Commonwealth forces would be the proportion of losses due to psychiatric casualties. The catch-all term for these cases was 'battle exhaustion'. The use of the First World War term 'shell-shock' was considered inappropriate - as explained in the Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC) report completed in 1945, it was 'administratively desirable' that psychiatric cases of a usually temporary duration should not be labelled by tags which implied mental disease or damage to the nervous system. Battle exhaustion cases fell into four main groups: -

Anxiety states
Depressive states
Conversion Hysteria (stammering, muteness, deafness, blindness and paralysis)
Physical exhaustion or the concussive effects of explosions

Other indications of diminished fighting spirit in the men would be high levels of desertion, self-inflicted wounds (SIWs), drunkenness and insubordination.

Psychologist Major J Rickman interviews officer candidate January 1944 ©IWM H35420

Predictions

Estimations of total battle casualties for the first three months of the Normandy campaign had been calculated in March 1944 but no prediction had been made of what fraction of these losses would be due to battle exhaustion or other psychological reasons. Experience in overseas theatres had shown that the proportion of soldiers breaking down with psychiatric disorders accounted for between 5% and 30% of all casualties but there was no consensus about whether the numbers in Normandy would be on the high or low side. High numbers of battle exhaustion cases would seriously diminish the fighting strength of 21st Army Group (because of the shortage of replacements) and have a detrimental effect on overall morale. There was a recognition, therefore, that psychiatric casualties had to be minimised and those soldiers that did break down had to be treated quickly and effectively.

For the first three years of the war, the treatment of battle exhaustion casualties was not given much attention by parts of the British Army. For example, in the medical planning for Operation TORCH (November 1942) there was no provision made for psychiatry. In April 1942, the Directorate of Army Psychiatry (DAP) was created with the aim of preventing and treating psychological cases.

It soon began to produce what appeared to be some very impressive results. Major Harold Palmer, in charge of a forward psychiatric unit in Tripoli from January 1943, claimed that of the 12000 patients he dealt with, 95% returned to full duty within a month and 98% within two months. In fact, only 30% of those soldiers went back to their units, the rest were posted elsewhere within Eighth Army. Nevertheless, such reports convinced General Adam at the end of 1943 that "...if the psychiatrists' assistance is sought quickly, the permanent loss from battle exhaustion will be negligible".

Not all senior government and military personnel shared the Adjutant-General's enthusiasm. Many were suspicious about the work of psychiatrists, indeed Churchill himself wrote in December 1942: -

"...it would be sensible to restrict as much as possible the work of these gentlemen, who are capable of doing an immense amount of harm with what may very easily degenerate into charlatanry".

The mere presence of psychiatrists at the front would, it was feared, diminish the fighting spirit of the men. If soldiers knew that a 'psychiatric escape route' was available, the danger was that many would simulate a breakdown in order to make use of it. A further concern among officers was, because psychiatrists were mainly recruited from civilian practice, they would sympathise with the soldier who wished to avoid death or injury rather than consider the need of the army to retain as many men as possible. Undeterred by these criticisms, the DAP saw the Normandy campaign as "...the ideal stage on which to present the skills of the army psychiatrist". (Jones & Ironside p110) It was hoped that measures put in place prior to the invasion would keep battle exhaustion cases to a minimum.

Field Hospital in Normandy

Preparations

The identification and removal of unsuitable soldiers before they came into contact with the enemy was one of these measures. The selection process introduced in mid 1941 (see Article 1) was, in part, an attempt to 'weed out' new recruits considered unfit for military service, although this was done mainly on the basis of low intelligence rather than the individual's propensity to disintegrate under stress. Officer candidates were subjected to a series of psychometric tests to determine potential flaws in character and also had to undergo an interview with a psychiatrist before being recommended for a commission. How successful these methods were is open to doubt: the problem was, as one psychiatrist remarked after the war "...there was no adequate test of courage". Further screening of deficient personnel took place as training intensified in the run-up to D-Day. For example, 3rd Canadian Division lost 150 men (including three officers and one NCO) in the period just before the invasion. However, not all formations were as diligent and screening was uneven. The ever present manpower issue also contributed to many units retaining men who should have been discarded or placed in support roles.

Another factor that encouraged many observers was the belief that the psychological impact of tactical training would make men less likely to succumb to battle exhaustion. We saw in Article 3 that battle inoculation training was an important component of the Battle School syllabus, with the aim of making soldiers better able to deal with the shocks and noises of war and cope with the physical and mental effects of fear. However, as we have seen, no amount of training could adequately prepare infantrymen for the realities of combat. The importance of sound leadership was also recognised. Because of improvements made in selection and training, it was hoped that junior officers and NCOs would maintain morale by their example in the field and thus win their subordinates' respect and confidence. Unfortunately, not all of them were up to the task. The other problem was that when an officer who was popular and well-regarded got seriously injured or killed, this often had a detrimental effect on the fighting spirit of the men under his command.

Once the campaign was underway, a further measure relied on to reduce the impact of psychological casualties was the 'forward psychiatry' approach or the P.I.E. method of treatment (proximity to combat, immediacy and expectation of recovery). The procedure was that the initial assessment of cases was to be undertaken by regimental medical officers (RMOs) in the field and soldiers deemed to suffering from combat induced stress would then be referred to an 'exhaustion centre' (one for each corps). Admissions were to be held for a maximum of 48 hours and, if not recovered, transferred to a special unit located in Bayeux (32 General [Psychiatric] Hospital) which would eventually contain 600 beds. Here, five days of treatment was considered enough to return most men to some form of duty, more difficult cases were then to be evacuated to the UK. In view of the large numbers of men referred to exhaustion centres and the length of time it took them to recover, the preparations seem, in hindsight, hopelessly inadequate. However, Lt.Col. Tom Main, the chief psychiatric adviser for 21st Army Group, was confident that rigorous selection, improved training and good leadership skills would ensure that battle exhaustion cases would be light (at least initially) and that recovery and return to the front-line would be rapid.

Canadian infantry pause for a meal ©Library and Archives Canada

Battle Exhaustion Cases in British 2nd Army June-September 1944

A B C

6-24 June 928 11.1 1.67

24 June-29 July 6288 23.8 3.14

29 July-16 Sept 2199 14.2 1.17

A - Total exhaustion cases

B - Cases as a percentage of total battle casualties

C - Weekly exhaustion rate per 1000 men

Source: HQ 2nd Army: An Account of the Operations of Second Army in Europe 1944-1945 Vol.II Wellcome Collection, p.482 available here

Losses due to Battle Exhaustion

The landings of 6th June and the initial lodgement did indeed produce few psychiatric casualties but they began to increase as fighting intensified from the last week of June onwards. The figures in the table give the battle exhaustion cases in British 2nd Army from 6th June to 16th September and the pattern of a steep increase in late June and throughout July to a gradual diminution towards the end of the campaign was broadly repeated in the Canadian forces. It will come as no surprise to learn that the vast majority of battle exhaustion cases were experienced by infantry units. Between 6th July and 21st August there were 1721 exhaustion admissions to 32 General [Psychiatric] Hospital at Bayeux of which 1118 (65%) were infantrymen (remember that infantry forces made up less than 20% of 21st Army Group manpower). This percentage was six times higher than Royal Artillery cases and ten times higher than those from Royal Armoured Corps in the same period. As the numbers rose the forward psychiatry provisions came under enormous strain and overflow units had to be set up. A survey of seven casualty stations conducted from July to September showed that, of a total of 4115 admissions, 1608 (39%) were exhaustion cases. Not only were case rates higher than the DAP had expected, recovery times were longer. By the first week of July it was apparent that most soldiers failed to recover within 48 hours, over 50% of cases had to be evacuated to the UK and only 15% had been returned to front-line duty.

The sharp rise in cases during July caused serious concern and senior officers sought explanations and solutions. Many RMOs had received inadequate psychiatric training and found it difficult to distinguish between men suffering genuine psychological trauma and those who were simply frightened. Some Field Ambulance commanders thought that too many exhaustion cases were being diagnosed when, in fact, a significant minority of soldiers were using it as an excuse to remove themselves from danger. The pressures on corps exhaustion centres meant that large numbers of men were being sent back over the Channel, never to return. So, in July, efforts were made to reduce the number of soldiers leaving the line due to battle exhaustion. Some of these initiatives were disciplinary in nature, for example VIII Corps commander Lt-General O'Connor ordered his divisional commanders to court martial any soldiers who feigned exhaustion as a means of leaving the line and Major-General MacMillan (GOC 15th Division) instructed that any NCO who had been treated for exhaustion should lose their stripes when returned to unit.

However, most attention was paid to reducing the number of men being referred to exhaustion centres. In some units, platoon commanders were ordered to send men showing signs of combat stress to the transport lines for rest rather than immediate referral to the medical facilities. On 3rd July the Deputy Director of Medical Services for 2nd Army told RMOs to examine exhaustion casualties with as much thoroughness as any other sick or wounded man with the aim of weeding out minor cases and malingerers. By the end of July, the policy aim was that no soldier suffering from stress should be allowed to leave the field without the permission of his commanding officer. These measures had some effect in bringing down the number of exhaustion referrals but it was the lessening intensity of the fighting and increasing success on the battlefield that were the chief reasons why psychiatric casualty numbers diminished - as the military position improved, so did morale.

Medical Orderly administers a reviving cigarette to patient, 7th June ©IWM H39240

Desertion, SIWs, Drunkenness and Insubordination

Heavy incidences of the above issues would provide further evidence of a morale crisis in the Commonwealth forces. Desertion, or going absent without leave (AWOL) in 21st Army Group did increase during the campaign and, as was the case with battle exhaustion, most of the soldiers displaying this behaviour were infantrymen. There were 537 convictions for desertion or AWOL in British 2nd Army armoured and infantry divisions from June to August (no figures for 3rd Division) of which 86% came from the infantry. The drivers of desertion were similar to the drivers of battle exhaustion - stress of combat, death or serious injury of friends or respected officers, being 'kept in the dark' and so on. There was also evidence that pre-existing psychological conditions also played a part. An inquiry into 200 deserters from 21st Army Group concluded that only 43% had 'normal, stable personalities', another indication that the weeding out process was not particularly effective. However, the overall rise in the rate of desertion was modest. In the whole of 21st Army Group the number of court martial convictions (most of which were for AWOL or desertion) rose from 0.077 men per 100 in May to only 0.189 men per 100 in August. The number of AWOL and desertion cases in British 2nd Army between June and September (978) was not excessive given that there were 420,000 British Army servicemen in Normandy by the end of July.

Instances of self-inflicted wounds were also not a major issue for 21st Army Group commanders, at least statistically speaking. In the whole of British Army units serving overseas in 1944-45 only 208 soldiers were convicted of injuring themselves in order to avoid duty. However, this was a big increase on previous years and the higher prevalence of these incidents in Normandy led to the setting up of an inquiry into the matter. The investigation, conducted by Major A.T.A Browne, which reported in late August, also included cases of accidental woundings, so the figures have to be treated with caution. Browne found that the problem was mostly confined to the rifle companies, with 279 recorded infantry cases out of a total of 388, but concluded that there was no serious threat to morale from these increases. Nor does it appear that widespread drunkenness and insubordination were pressing problems in the British and Canadian armies. Some soldiers relied on alcohol for Dutch courage and local wine, cider and calvados (apple brandy) were widely available but these were used as occasional stimulants and not persistently imbibed.

Specific Units and Formations

Many writers, including senior former Allied officers, have claimed that the veteran formations Montgomery brought back from the Mediterranean theatre (particularly 7th Armoured Division and 51st Highland Division) failed to perform adequately in Normandy due to battle weariness, resentment at being recalled for the invasion and a consequent unwillingness to take risks. Some units within these divisions certainly experienced high levels of battle exhaustion at various stages of the campaign and at times both formations suffered serious reverses in battle, e.g. 7th Armoured at Villers-Bocage in June, 51st Division at Colombelles in July. The rate of psychiatric casualties and desertion in these divisions and in 50th Division (the third veteran division) was consistently above average and gave some cause for concern. However, at the time, the perceived shortcomings in 7th Armoured and 51st Division were blamed on poor leadership. Bullen-Smith, GOC 51st Division was dismissed in July after the Colombelles failure and Erskine, GOC 7th Armoured was removed in early August. The tendency of these formations to exhibit greater caution was probably due to acquired shrewdness and wariness in the field and the desire to minimise losses did not necessarily indicate weaker morale, rather superior combat awareness. Although veteran units may have lacked the élan of fresh troops this rarely resulted in a significantly marked reduction in performance.

In the cases of specific units, by far the most serious example was that of 6th Duke of Wellington's Regiment. The collapse in morale was so catastrophic that the CO, Lt-Colonel A.J.D. Turner claimed in his report that on two occasions he "...had to stand at the end of a track and draw my revolver on retreating men". However, as David French has pointed out, the battalion was the victim of a series of unlucky events which led to an extremely large number of officer and other rank losses in a very short period of time (23 officer and 350 OR casualties in 14 days) including 40 killed or injured by German shells when the regiment had been moved to a place of relative safety. Other units also exhibited fragile states of morale. Le Régiment de la Chaudière of Canadian 8 Brigade consistently displayed high rates of battle exhaustion, SIWs, desertion and AWOL. After its mauling at Carpiquet in early July it was thereafter handled with care, mainly in a support role. At sub-unit level there were numerous examples where companies and platoons suffered a temporary drop in morale only to recover relatively quickly and without reducing the effectiveness of the battalion as a whole. On 19th July the Canadian 5th Brigade's attack on Fleury-sur-Orne got off to a bad start when Le Régiment de Maisonneuve's two leading companies formed up on the opening line for their supporting barrage instead of their assigned start line. The result was that these companies took the full weight of 'friendly' shellfire, were demoralised and had to be evacuated. However, despite this the two remaining companies carried on with the attack and took the objective.

A Crisis in Morale?

Assessing the morale of the infantry units of 21st Army Group during the Normandy campaign is fraught with difficulties. The evidence we have examined in respect of the various indicators of poor morale is incomplete, subjective and sometimes unreliable. In the case of battle exhaustion, RMOs were under intense pressure from the RAMC and their own regiments to keep the number of referrals to exhaustion centres to a minimum once the criteria for medical transfer had been tightened. There were also no formal diagnostic guidelines so individual RMOs had to identify cases in their own way. With desertion, it was often difficult to distinguish between premeditated absence and simple loss of nerve resulting in a temporary truancy. COs could exercise considerable discretion in how to deal with offenders. This was also true with SIWs - many COs were reluctant to report these incidents in case it reflected badly on the regiment. It is also perfectly possible that many cases of self-wounding were genuine accidents as many weapons (including captured enemy firearms) had unreliable safety features. The inconclusive nature of the evidence means that caution must be exercised in reaching judgements about the fighting spirit of infantry units throughout the campaign.

However, it is possible to draw some general conclusions. The concern expressed by Montgomery and others before D-Day about the fragile state of morale in the invasion force (see Article 1) was, to some extent, justified by events in Normandy. Forward psychiatry and the P.I.E. approach did have some beneficial impact - a 21st Army Group report claimed that, from 6th June to 25th July, 65% of exhaustion cases were returned to some form of duty, half of those to the front line. The number of psychiatric cases was probably overestimated in the first three weeks of the campaign and underestimated thereafter. The rifle companies were the units most affected by battle exhaustion, desertion and SIWs.

The main point is that, despite the alarms, worries and examples of units and formations performing below expectation in battle, poor morale never critically impacted on the fighting power of 21st Army Group. This is not to say that the gloom and disappointment that was prevalent in many infantry battalions (particularly after the failure of operations such as GOODWOOD and SPRING) had no effect on battlefield capability, merely that this did not reach the stage where men displayed mass disobedience or refused to fight. It is worth noting that the Army did some things very well in order to maintain morale. Ensuring that soldiers had good quantities of food rations was considered important and the the Army Catering Corps did sterling work in supplying regular hot meals to front line troops. Similarly, water rations and unlimited quantities of tea were crucial to the wellbeing of the British soldier and the government made sure that there was never less than 30 million tons of tea stored in English warehouses. One officer commented: -

"...if the supplies (of tea) had ever failed the morale of the army would have been reduced more than by a major defeat".

Although theoretically non-essential, the provision of cigarettes was also given a high priority by the high command. Most infantrymen were smokers in civilian life and, given the stress of military service, it would have been counter-productive to add to their psychological strain had they been denied cigarettes during active duty. Regular deliveries of mail were also vital in maintaining morale in all ranks though, of course, letters could contain bad news as well as good. Most importantly of all, regular rotation and rest from the front line was necessary to ensure that infantrymen had the chance to recuperate and recover from intense periods of action. The Army tried to make sure that, after units had been involved in heavy combat, they were removed from danger at least on a temporary basis. The importance of these interludes is well explained by Lieutenant Stuart Hills: -

"Whenever we came out of action...there was a feeling of exuberance in spite of the casualties...we knew that for a short spell the numbness would disappear from our minds and bodies and that, for a change, we could be human beings rather than automatons of destruction".

Fragile morale was a problem for 21st Army Group. Battle exhaustion, desertion and self-inflicted wounds did reduce manpower and diminish the fighting spirit of the Commonwealth forces, the infantry battalions especially. However, it never approached a crisis or seriously threatened the outcome of the campaign.

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